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Repression of the Political Emigre-The
Underground to International Law:
A Proposal for Remedy
Jack I. Garveyt
Consider a society where persons of a certain class are targeted by
foreign powers for murder, assault, and extortion. The domestic po-
lice forces rarely protect victims and occasionally even aid the foreign
predator. Moreover, in this society the executive refuses to enforce
statutes available to constrain this activity. The description could be
a political fiction from an Orwellian pen. It is, however, reality for
many political emigres residing in the United States.
The incidents of emigre repression in the United States are only
one aspect of a more pervasive phenomenon that this article defines
as the underground to international law. Although this phenomenon
remains largely hidden from public view, and indeed must remain
hidden to flourish, recent disclosures in the press' and courts2 have
revealed a certain pattern of violations of domestic and international
law. Attacks on emigres have come in many forms. They have been
part of a larger systematic program of suppression of political dissent,
at home and abroad, such as the activities in the United States of
SAVAK, the Iranian police of the government of the Shah.3 Overseas
attacks have included assassinations of exiled government officials such
as the murders by Chilean agents of Orlando Letelier in the United
States and Carlos Prat in Argentina. 4 A variety of forms of harassment
t Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law; A.B., Harvard 1964; J.D. 1968.
1. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 1, cols. 1, 4 (reporting on activities in
United States of police and intelligence agencies of Iran, Philippines, Taiwan, Chile, Soviet
Union, and Yugoslavia, documented in classified Senate staff report). The Columbia
Broadcasting System's television show 60 Minutes on March 2, 1980 reported on repression
by Iranian agents of Iranian political dissidents living in France and the United States.
2. See United States v. Novo Sampol, No. 79-1541 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1980) (appeal
of criminal conviction for assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier);
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
3. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 1.
4. See United States v. Novo Sampol, No. 79-1541, slip op. at 2-4, 62 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
15, 1980).
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have also occurred, including blackmail, surveillance, threats, and
other intimidations of emigres5 or their attorneys. 6
In addition to its clear violation of domestic laws, the underground
operates contrary to several international legal norms. It violates the
fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty that restricts the reach
of the police forces of one sovereign into the territorial jurisdiction
of another.7 In addition, this activity offends long standing recogni-
tion of rights of emigration.8 Perhaps of greatest concern is its clear
inconsistency with recently developed but now widely accepted human
rights principles.9
The underground has been able to survive despite its contravention
of legal norms, in part, because of its low visibility. Moreover, nations
enjoy significant foreign relations and intelligence benefits from par-
ticipation despite the legal prohibitions. Finally, the underground
flourishes because the individuals adversely affected by it have no
legal remedy against it.
This article proposes an avenue of redress for political emigres re-
siding in the United States who are attacked by agents from their
nation of citizenship. Part I describes the underground and the sac-
rifice of domestic and international legal values it has wrought. Part
II argues that civil process in the federal courts provides the greatest
promise for an effective remedy and that the remedy should be pro-
vided through the development of a federal common law of inter-
national tort. Part III discusses the problems and practicalities of liti-
gation to implement the tort remedy.
I. The Problem and Need for a Remedy
The intimidation and injury of aliens residing in the United States
by agents acting for foreign powers has come increasingly into public
5. The author represented a Philippine emigre family living in the United States whose
son was imprisoned in the Philippines. The Marcos regime apparently sought to use the
threat of harm to the son and other family members to obtain the assets of the family
through commercial contracts. See Philippine News, Oct. 7-13, 1978, at 4, cols. 4-5 (copy
on file with Yale Law Journal).
6. See Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 15, 1979, at 8, col. I (Federal Bureau of Investigation
supplied information to Polish intelligence service concerning personal affairs of attorneys
representing dissident Polish emigres).
7. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)
("The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and abso-
lute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself."); M. KAPLAN & N. KATzeN-
BACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 56-80, 135-72, 231-64 (1961).
8. See p. 86 infra.
9. See pp. 85-86 infra.
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view. News articles and other media reports,10 at least one federal
prosecution,"1 and related civil litigation 12 have recounted numerous
incidents of emigre repression. The most comprehensive record is con-
tained in a secret staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Subcommittee on International Operations (Senate Report).
13
The various revelations, viewed comprehensively, reveal an extraor-
dinary pattern of harassment, surveillance, blackmail, and threats of
assassination carried out in the United States against individual aliens
by foreign police and intelligence organizations, and by political and
business agents of foreign regimes. 14
The most notorious case, the assassination in Washington, D.C., of
the former Ambassador from Chile, Orlando Letelier, by agents of the
Chilean secret police, 15 represents only one extreme of the pattern
of foreign agent repression of the emigre. The activity, considered as
a whole, constitutes a clear confrontation between state practice and
the requirements of legal order in the United States and in the world
community.
A. The Underground to International Law
These revelations have exposed an underground of foreign agent
activity. Although the full scope and particular practice of this under-
ground activity is hidden from view, the public disclosures provide
some understanding of this remarkable reality. The United States is
only one participant among other nations. 16 The underground some-
times operates in a framework of explicit intelligence and police
liaison agreements, but, characteristically, it operates through tacit
understanding and forced acquiescence. The principal actors are po-
lice, intelligence personnel, and other political and business agents
of the participating states. States allow these foreign agents to operate
within their sovereign territorial jurisdiction because of the mutual
benefits realized for their foreign intelligence and policing interests.17
10. See note 1 supra.
11. United States v. Novo Sampol, No. 79-1541 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1980).
12. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
13. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2. The report was made available
to the author by columnist Jack Anderson and his associate Dale Van Atta, whom I thank
for their assistance. Review of the original report confirms the accuracy of the Washington
Post articles.
14. See id.
15. See United States v. Novo Sampol, No. 79-1541, slip op. at 2-4 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15,
1980); J. DINGES & S. LANDAU, ASSASSINATION ON EMBASSY Row (1980).
16. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 4.
17. Id. at cols. 1, 2, 4.
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The record of foreign agent activity in the United States clearly
reveals the official governmental support accorded the underground.
The Senate Report and materials disclosed by Freedom of Informa-
tion Act requests document the role of United States government
agencies.' 8 The executive has rarely enforced applicable criminal stat-
utes.' 9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, at times, has avoided
interfering with foreign agents and, in some cases, even cooperated
with them. 20 Moreover, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has
had intelligence liaison agreements with certain foreign organizations.
The Senate Report noted that on one occasion, the CIA provided
intelligence information for targeting a prominent critic of the Shah
for assassination. 21 Sometimes federal law enforcement has been sty-
mied as a result of threats communicated from high officials of the
predator government. Such threats apparently enabled SAVAK, the
Iranian police of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to harass and coerce
Iranians living in the United States. 22 The quid pro quo for such
inaction against SAVAK was protection of United States intelligence
operations in Iran.23
This activity comprises an underground to international law24 in
18. See id.; Memorandum from unidentified Federal Bureau of Investigation Special
Agent to Special Agent in Charge, FBI Chicago Office (Jan. 12, 1971) (FBI passed infor-
mation to Polish intelligence agency concerning Chicago attorney representing Polish
emigres) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal).
19. Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 13, cols. 2-6 (Senate staff report details
activities of foreign agents in United States unhindered by domestic law enforcement
efforts); see note 27 infra (foreign agents registration statutes).
20. Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 12, cols. 3-6.
21. Id. at 12, col. 1.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 1, col. 1; id. at 12, col. 3.
24. Attacks on emigres have become so pervasive a feature of contemporary political
struggle that in their most extreme manifestations they have occurred outside the under-
ground, pursuant to official and public announcement of national policy. Colonel Muam-
mar Qaddafi of Libya has called for "the physical liquidation of the enemies of the revolu-
tion abroad," announcing to the world that his agents are being sent to other countries to
assassinate Libyan political emigres; there is substantial evidence that such assassinations
and related intimidation have occurred. See The Times (London), June 14, 1980, at 1,
col. 4; N.Y. Times, April 12, 1980, at 5, col. 4. Similarly, the former Iranian victims of
SAVAK repression abroad, now themselves in power, have announced that they have
sent execution squads abroad to kill Iranian political dissidents opposed to the present
regime. The recent assassination in Washington of the former press attache to the Shah,
and the attempted assassination in Paris of the former Prime Minister of Iran, indicate
the results of this policy. See N.Y. Times, July 23, 1980, at 1, col. 5; International Herald
Tribune, June 11, 1980, at 1, col. 1. These attacks, based on declared public policy, do
not indicate rejection of, or diminishing importance of, the underground. The under-
ground was simply not available to the present Iranian and Libyan regimes for attacks
in England, France, and the United States, as it had been for the Shah of Iran as ally
and benefactor of these countries. Cf. N. LF cH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM 264 (1973) (espionage can be considered
"the underworld of international relations').
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that police, intelligence, and political agents operate in patterns that
mimic traditional international law. These patterns are based in cus-
tom, mutual interest, and international consensus, as are norms styled
"international law."
Yet this customary system of international relations, as an "under-
ground," differs critically from the customary relations that constitute
international law. International law, unlike the underground system,
is defined through the public processes in which state responsibility is
asserted-diplomatic intervention, publicly stated opinions of law of-
ficers and text writers, international adjudication and arbitration,
treaties, and conventions. International law depends upon sanctions
arising from the calculus of political cost and advantage operating in
the framework of public process.
2 5
The underground system is divorced from the legitimating referent
of public political consensus. Its uniqueness and its significance for
the relations of states rest on the fact that it is an internation,-l rela-
tions underground, operating in stealth, subverting municipal norms
and overt standards for relations between states. It is an insidious sys-
tem because it requires sacrifice of domestic and international legal
norms. The sacrifice occurs naturally, and until recent disclosures, it
occurred without any embarrassment. The agencies and agents see self-
justification in the national interests reflected by the underground
system and in the presumed requirements of maintaining that system,
whatever the cost to legal order and principle.
25. Public processes such as diplomatic protest are widely regarded as the primary
vehicle for asserting human rights claims. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 431-34 (1964) (executive engages in diplomacy to assure that United States
citizens harmed by foreign expropriation are compensated fairly); N. LEECH, C. OLIVER,
& J. SWEENEY, supra note 24, at 573. Remedies other than diplomatic protest such as
judicial proceedings are recognized, but they also exist in the public realm. See Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3935 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980) (federal courts available
to adjudicate certain allegations of international law violations). More generally, the
sources of law applied by international tribunals, such as international custom or con-
vention, all require some element of publicity in application. Cf. STATUTE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUsTIcE art. 38 (means for determining standards of international law).
There is, of course, an arena of non-public international dealings, in the form of secret
negotiations and agreements, and espionage. Whether these give rise to enforceable rights
or redressable wrongs in the international legal system is a subject of some dispute.
Secret agreements, however, would seem to be unenforceable unless they were made public.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 102 (all international treaties and agreements must be registered
with Secretariat; party to unregistered agreement may not invoke such agreement before
any United Nations organ). Espionage is often regarded a violation of territorial sov-
ereignty, but states tend to disown captured spies thus avoiding any public confrontation.
Rather, the customary remedies are regulation through domestic laws punishing spies,
counterespionage, and counterattack in kind. See N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, supra
note 24, at 264; Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in International
Affairs, in EssAYs ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL L%w 3 (L. Stanger ed. 1972).
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B. A Sacrifice of Value
The underground achieves protection for extraterritorial police and
intelligence activities only at great cost. The thrust of foreign police
powers into the United States clearly undermines domestic and inter-
national legal order.
In relation to domestic legal order, the harassment, blackmail, and
assaults perpetrated by agents in the underground violate widely rec-
ognized personal rights protected by state tort law.20 In addition, these
agents often violate criminal statutes, including murder laws and
federal foreign agent registration requirements.
2 7
The cooperation of United States officials with the underground
operatives also may violate constitutional rights. Alienage does not
deprive a person of the protection of the Constitution. 28 Tolerance by
26. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 28-62 (4th ed. 1971) (torts of in-
tentional interference with the person).
27. The Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1976), prohibits any
person from acting as the agent of a foreign principal unless he has registered with the
Attorney General. Section 951 of title 18 of the United States Code requires that non-
diplomats who act within the United States as agents of a foreign government register
with the Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. § 951 (1976). Section 851 of title 50 of the United
States Code requires that certain persons who have received instruction or assignment in
espionage or counterespionage register with the Attorney General. 50 U.S.C. § 851 (1976).
28. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state distinction based on alienage
is suspect classification under Fourteenth Amendment). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding New York State's exclusion of aliens from police force).
Although the Supreme Court has sharply restricted state regulation on the basis of
alienage, it has accorded the federal government broad powers over aliens. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) (upholding statute imposing more severe Medicaid
eligibility requirements on aliens than non-aliens; distinguishing Graham v. Richardson,
supra, on ground that Constitution commits alien regulation to political branches of fed-
eral government); Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. Rv. 275, 295-318 (Court has invalidated state
discrimination against aliens but often gives only perfunctory review to federal controls
on alien exclusion, deportation, and naturalization). Judicial deference to the political
branches is often explained by reference to the political question doctrine. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-82 (policy towards aliens interwoven with contemporane-
ous policies concerning foreign relations and war powers); Rosberg, sutra, at 324 (complex
issues unamenable to judicial resolution inherent in formation of immigration policy
require judicial deference in alien regulation matters); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962) (discussing political question doctrine).
Nonetheless, both the Supreme Court and commentators have affirmed that the Con-
stitution does protect alien rights. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
101-03 (1976) (Civil Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens from employment
in federal competitive civil service deprives resident aliens of liberty without due process);
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (Fifth Amendment due
process clause limits government authority to seize non-enemy, alien property); L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 252-54 (1972) (Constitution does not suggest indi-
vidual rights implicating foreign affairs differ from rights touching exercise of other
government powers). Control of emigre repression does not present many of the judicially
unmanageable policy concerns that prompt judicial deference to executive and congres-
sional regulation of immigration policy, See pp. 89-94 infra.
The Yale Law Journal
United States government officials of foreign agents' attacks on emigres
appears to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2 9
More commonly, First Amendment rights are impaired because the
foreign operatives typically seek to chill public discussion in the United
States.30 Underground activities often stifle criticism of foreign govern-
ments, especially of those with highly questionable human rights rec-
ords. 31 In addition to the obvious civil liberties dangers, great political
dangers inhere in such repression as evidenced by the failure in the
United States to appreciate the revolutionary potential in Iran, par-
tially because SAVAK choked off the expression of dissident Iranians
in the United States.
3 2
In addition to undermining domestic American legal order, the
underground threatens international legal norms. The intrusion of
foreign police powers across national frontiers often offends the prin-
ciple of territorial sovereignty. 33 The underground operation of agents
of one nation within the borders of another clearly violates this fun-
damental principle of international law.3 4 Although on some occasions
this intervention occurs with the permission of the host state, frequent-
ly underground agents act without such prior consent. Both situations
are illustrated by the activities of Iranian government agents in the
United States. Before the fall of the Shah, the United States acquiesced
in SAVAK operations3 5 but now it asserts opposition to the current
government's operations.36 In both situations, however, a violation
29. Aliens clearly enjoy some protections under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-03 (1976); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,
282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931). Of course, the Fifth Amendment does not operate directly on
the agents of a foreign sovereign, particularly if those agents act without the knowledge
or consent of American officials. Constitutional concerns arise when the United States
government gives the foreign agents permission to act against aliens in the United States.
Although not all activity directed against aliens would infringe the rights guaranteed
by the due process clause because no deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurred,
the more extreme forms of emigre repression would seem to qualify.
30. As in the case of Fifth Amendment protections, an alien could avail himself of
the First Amendment only by showing sufficient nexus between the foreign operatives
and the United States government. In addition, the courts would likely require less of a
justification by the federal government for participating in the chilling of alien rights
of expression than demanded when citizen rights are infringed. Even if a technical First
Amendment violation does not occur, repression of emigre speech presents the same
dangers the First Amendment protects against.
31. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 13, cols. 3-7.
32. See id.
33. See note 7 supra.
34. See Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichman, 36 I.L.R. 5 (District Court of Jerusalem,
Israel, 1968) (abduction by citizens of Israel of alien residing in Argentina violated Ar-
gentinian sovereignty).
35. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 1.
36. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1980, at 1, col. 5 (investigation of assassination of former
Iranian press attache in Washington, D.C.).
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of territorial sovereignty has arguably occurred. The fact that agencies
of one nation approve tacitly of foreign agent repression of emigres
cannot automatically waive territorial sovereignty. Such approval is
not given through the ordinary, constitutional channels that legitimate
any exercise of sovereign authority. It is not a legal "waiver," but an
attempt to avoid the public process of justification crucial to inter-
national law. Recognizing the surreptitious agreements or tacit un-
derstandings between police agencies as effectively waiving territorial
sovereignty would seriously undermine the international legal order,
which depends upon sanctions calculated from the political costs aris-
ing from public assertions of responsibility. The surreptitious agree-
ments and tacit understandings are in fact part of the underground
system and the illicit trade that flourishes through avoidance of public
scrutiny or justification.
The impact of the underground can also be perceived as violative
of individual rights under international law. The subject of alien
rights has developed as an important category of international law
articulated in a large body of international agreements, judicial analy-
sis, and formal exposition.3 T In the traditional positivist formulation,
only states, and not individuals, are subjects of international law38
and alien rights therefore may not exist in adverse relationship to
the state of nationality. 39 Contemporary international legal doctrine,
however, has challenged this traditional formulation. There is now a
substantial body of literature and several international human rights
declarations rejecting the older doctrine and arguing that individuals
as such have become the subject of international law and that indi-
vidual rights are therefore a matter of independent and ultimate
37. See, e.g., P. Jassup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 94-122 (1948) (state responsibility
for injury to aliens); N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, supra note 24, at 572-606 (same);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 164-214 (1965)
(same).
38. E.g., I L. OPPENHEINI, INTERNATIONAL LAw 18-19 (1905) ("[S]tates solely and exclu-
sively are the subjects of International Law."); id. at 344 (individuals are objects, not
subjects, of international law).
39. See RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§
171(b)-(c), 174, 175 (1965) (in absence of special circumstances alien may not invoke claim
against state of citizenship).
The precise scope of remedies available in international law to persons against their
state of citizenship is uncertain. As recently as 1975, a panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals declared that "violations of international law do not occur when the ag-
grieved parties are nationals of the acting state." Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). Another panel of the same court recently criti-
cized this statement as "clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of inter-
national law." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3929 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980).
The Filartiga panel, however, cautioned that the scope of rights available against the state
of citizenship "will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration." Id. at 3930.
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value under international law.40 This is particularly so with respect
to the political emigre. Although there is no consensus on any "right
of asylum" that requires a state originally to grant asylum,41 the "right
of emigration" has been widely affirmed, most prominently through
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
provides that "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution." 42 Article 14 also constitutes the
preamble to the Declaration on Territorial Asylum approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1967.43
This international doctrine embodies not only an individual right
of emigration, but also a correspondent duty of the state that grants
asylum to protect the emigre against the overweening claims of the
pursuing state of nationality.4
4
Despite these apparent violations, the international underground
flourishes. States have great incentives to participate in the illegal
activity both to destroy political dissent and to facilitate foreign in-
telligence gathering. Moreover, legal mechanisms to terminate the
underground activity are lacking. Even as strong a statement of emigre
rights as Article 14 of the Declaration of Human Rights does not
provide a corresponding remedy for the individual emigre under na-
tional or international legal procedures. Although individual alien
rights can be identified as independent values under international
law, available remedies generally reflect the traditional positivist view
of international law.45 In the absence of special treaties, or interna-
tional procedures established by the agreement of states, international
law is remedial only for states, not individuals, and responsibility of
a state under international law for injury to an alien can be invoked
40. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948); P. JEssuP, supra note 37, at 68-93; McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Nationality
and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Areas, 83 YALE L.J.
900 (1974).
41. See 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-131
(1972) (state practice of granting asylum widespread, but insufficient to identify as emerg-
ing customary rule).
42. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (1948).
43. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
44. The parameters of the right "to enjoy" asylum are unsettled. The right can be
traced back to Vattel, who asserted that states having granted asylum did have some af-
firmative obligation to aid the emigre. See E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 95-96 (1760,
translated from the French, 1st ed. 1758). Today, even in the absence of a clear statement
in the Declaration on the meaning of "enjoy," other United Nations declarations, such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, impose some obligation on states to protect
resident aliens. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948); cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3926 (2d Cir. June
30, 1980) (United Nations declarations specify obligations of members).
45. See N. LEEcH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWENEY, suPra note 24, at 573 (diplomatic protest
remains major vehicle for asserting human rights claims).
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only by the state of which the alien is a national. 46 An individual alien
generally lacks the procedural capacity to assert rights before inter-
national tribunals.47 Traditionally, recourse for the alien seeking vin-
dication of rights under international law is to have the state of which
he is a national bring his claim before an international adjudicative
forum or for the state of nationality to press the alien's claim through
diplomatic channels. 43 Attack on the emigre by the state of nationality
therefore negates the essential dynamic of alien remedy under inter-
national law. The operation of the underground renders the tradi-
tional procedure for the assertion of alien rights not only useless, but
ironic.
Nor is it likely that the emigre can expect assistance from the state
of residence. When the host state surreptitiously accepts the presence
of foreign agents, that same state will not protest the subsequent acts
of those agents against resident aliens. Even when the agents are un-
welcome, the need for maintaining amicable relations with their sov-
ereign may restrict the ability of the host state to respond to their il-
legal activities. In the United States, for example, neither Congress
nor the President has acted forcefully and comprehensively against the
underground. The Senate Report specifically criticized the President's
failure to use available alien agent registration statutes to regulate the
underground. 40 Such abstinence in this special zone of tension between
individual liberty and state authority is not aberrational. It can be un-
derstood as a product of the ongoing insecurities of international re-
lations. The roles of the executive and Congress have been dictated
generally by concern to avoid risk of harm to the foreign intelligence
and foreign relations interests of the United States.
Only in the most extreme cases, when the underground manifests
itself in a form so offensive as to cause domestic and international out-
rage, is the host state likely to act. Even then, however, the response
is likely to be belated and inadequate. For example, when agents
of the Chilean secret police murdered former ambassador Orlando
46. See id.; W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 267-69 (2d ed. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 174, 175 (1965).
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 19, 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, establishes a Commission on Human
Rights, which individuals may petition to remedy human rights violations.
47. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34 ("Only states may be
parties in cases before the Court.") Some international agreements, however, specifically
grant standing to private individuals. See note 46 supra.
48. See N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, supra note 24, at 573 (in eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, diplomatic protection primary method of protecting alien rights).
49. Cf. Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 13, cols. 2-6 (Senate staff report details
activities of foreign agents in United States unhindered by domestic law enforcement
efforts).
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Letelier by planting a bomb on his automobile and exploding it in
the streets of the nation's capital,50 there followed federal criminal
prosecutions and convictions,51 and the State Department announced
sanctions against Chile for its failure to cooperate with requests of
the United States government for the extradition of three implicated
Chilean officials.52 Yet the sanctions announced were either not car-
ried out or served only to formalize existing United States policy.
United States officials have been quoted as describing the announce-
ment of the sanctions as a "bluff." 53
Repression of the political emigre thus presents a unique contempo-
rary picture in which the individual and his presumed rights under
national and international law are sacrificed before an unusual com-
bination of political powers. The individual emigre is truly alone-
assaulted by the state of citizenship, abandoned by the state of resi-
dence, outside the protection of either state, and the victim of both.
II. The Rationale for a Statute-Based Federal Common
Law of International Tort
Because the underground maintains its vitality by promoting the
foreign relations and intelligence interests of participating states, any
proposal for a remedy that does not account for these interests would
be unrealistic and ineffective. The remedial challenge, therefore, is
to constrain the underground within a framework that serves the in-
terests of human rights and legal order while not unduly prejudicing
foreign relations interests.
A. The Least Vulnerable Branch
It is clear that in the United States, neither the executive nor the
Congress can be expected to provide a direct and comprehensive at-
tack on the underground. These political branches have often sought
to further intelligence and police functions at the cost of alien rights
and will most likely continue to do so.
Although agents of the underground have operated secure from
challenge by the political branches, they have shown some vulnerability
50. See United States v. Novo Sampol, No. 79-1541, slip op. at 2-7 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
15, 1980).
51. Id.
52. See 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 65 (1980) (sanctions imposed on Chile for failure to extra-
dite, announced Nov. 30, 1979).
58. Krause, U.S. Bluff in Letelier Case Bolsters Pinochet in Chile, Washington Post,
Jan. 2, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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to civil process. The threat of civil suit by political emigres against
the Marcos regime of the Philippines apparently induced payments to
the prospective plaintiffs.54 The damage action filed in the Letelier
affair further indicates the possibility of battling the underground
independently of the executive. 5
These initial forays against the underground demonstrate that civil
process may provide an effective recourse for the emigre. Unlike the
executive or Congress, the courts can resist and have resisted efforts
of the underground to subvert legal norms.
The courts are the branch least vulnerable to the underground. A
partial explanation may be that the executive and Congress are more
prone to sacrifice the interests of the alien to considerations of foreign
relations and foreign intelligence. However, adjudication may include
related distortions, such as bias against an alien plaintiff or bias in
favor of supporting a regime perceived as friendly to the United States.
The critical reason the judicial branch is least vulnerable is its funda-
mental incompatibility with the essential nature of the underground.
The civil order function of the judicial branch, unlike that of the Con-
gress or the executive, is initiated by the choice of the individual alien,
and proceeds through a necessarily public process. These are qualities
of civil process antithetical to the very essence of the underground.
B. Emigre Adjudication, Foreign Relations, and the
Foreign Intelligence Function
The attributes making the judiciary the branch least vulnerable to
the underground are also a source of comparative strength allowing
it to constrain the underground in ways the political branches cannot.
Executive protection of the underground to further foreign policy
interests suggests, however, an exclusive executive prerogative in re-
lation to the underground."6 Executive inaction may be a sign that
courts should refuse to interfere with the underground except to pro-
vide a forum for occasional Justice Department prosecutions.
54. The author represented a Philippine emigre family living in the United States
whose son was imprisoned in the Philippines. The Marcos regime made payments to the
family allegedly in response to the threat of suit to remedy a contract default. If not
removed, the defaults would have been the basis for alleging that the regime used the
son's imprisonment to extort property from the family. See Philippine News, Oct. 7-13,
1978, at 4, cols. 4-5 (copy on file with Yale Law Journal).
55. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (decision); Letelier
v. Republic of Chile, No. 78-1477 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1980) ($4.9 million damages awarded
to plaintiffs).
56. See C & S Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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1. Limits on Foreign Relations Interests and Executive Power
It is important to recognize, however, that values of human rights
and legal order do prescribe limits to foreign relations and foreign
intelligence interests under United States law. This is confirmed in
areas of extraterritorial regulation, such as application of the antitrust
laws or the securities laws, where United States domestic regulatory in-
terests may take precedence despite an adverse impact on international
relationships of the United States.57 The point is also evident in cases
where protections of the Bill of Rights have been found controlling
despite opposing claims of national security.58 In addition, foreign
affairs legislation sometimes reflects human rights limits on the for-
eign relations interest. Particularly relevant is legislation specifically
protecting emigre rights. The Jackson-Vanik Amendments to the
Trade Act of 1974,59 conditioning trade with the Soviet Union on its
granting freedom of emigration, are one obvious example. Considering
the substantial sacrifice of value resulting from the operation of the
underground, there may be acceptable justification for some degree
of impairment of executive power and of foreign relations and for-
eign intelligence interests in order to protect the emigre.
It is also important to recognize that the lack of control over the
underground does not necessarily serve the foreign relations of the
United States, and action against the underground therefore is not
necessarily adverse to the foreign relations interest. The international
relations of the United States are being significantly altered indepen-
dent of any policy process of the United States, and the excesses of the
underground create a constant potential for the embarrassment of
United States agencies and damage to the United States in its inter-
national relations. One aspect, for instance, is the impact on relations
between the United States and revolutionary movements once they
achieve power, most recently illustrated by the breakdown of relations
57. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (1945) (extra-
territorial application of United States laws); K. BRiwsTmR, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 39-52, 65-74 (1958) (foreign relations problems caused by extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws).
58. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (First Amend-
ment controls despite national security claim); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (judicial oversight necessary when for-
eign security interests affect constitutionally protected rights, especially when government
actions are not authorized by Congress and are not subject to public scrutiny).
59. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2432 (West Supp. 1980). Human rights provisions also have re-
stricted the coverage of foreign security assistance and foreign economic aid legislation.
See 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976), as amended by International Securities Assistance Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-384, §§ 6(a)-(d)(I), 92 Stat. 730 (arms exports, security assistance, and for-
eign economic assistance tied to human rights observance).
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between the United States and the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Ruhol-
lah Khomeini. The Iranian Revolutionary Council has pointed spe-
cifically to the failure of the United States to control emigre repression
as an important enduring source of ill will and distrust.60 The Iranians
naturally see the SAVAK terror that occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States as wholly within the power of the
United States to control. As the Iranian experience illustrates, the
failure to discourage the offensive foreign agent activity has, as its
natural corollary, the failure of the United States to adjust to the as-
sumption of power by former political dissidents, and more generally,
the failure to adjust to change in the international environment. Thus
the foreign relations interest itself argues for some imposition of con-
straint on the underground.
2. Judicial Competence and Foreign Relations
The most important reasons for rejecting the suggestion of an ex-
clusive executive prerogative are revealed through consideration of
the role of the judicial branch in matters touching on foreign rela-
tions. The Supreme Court stated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino0' that judicial action on issues pertaining to foreign af-
fairs requires an evaluation of the relative competence of the judiciary
and the other branches. 62 Some remarks in the course of the Sabbatino
opinion appear to suggest that the test for the courts is one-dimensional
-that the more important the implications of an issue for the foreign
relations of the United States, the less the justification for adjudica-
tion.03 Sabbatino, however, seen in its entirety, provides a more sophis-
ticated and pragmatic view of the role of adjudication in international
affairs by framing the issue as "the competency of dissimilar institu-
tions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area
of international relations." 64 Sabbatino goes well beyond consideration
of the importance of foreign relations implications to the more com-
prehensive and fundamental question of whether the foreign policy
implications of a given issue qualitatively argue in favor of political
60. See A Mullah's View: "No Deal, Sir," TIME, Nov. 26, 1979, at 31 (leading member
of Iranian Revolutionary Council condemns United States for allowing Shah's police to
violate United States law and harass Iranian students residing here).
61. 36 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (United States courts will not review propriety of Cuban
government's expropriation of sugar within Cuba).
62. See id. at 423-28 (foreign relations implication does not automatically remove case
from judicial review).
63. See id. at 428 ("[T]he less important the implications of an issue are for our
foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.")
64. Id. at 423.
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or judicial disposition. The Supreme Court explained that the choice
between judicial involvement or abstention must be analyzed in terms
of the traditional handling of a particular question, the susceptibility
of the question to adjudication, and the consequences of such ad-
judication.65
In Sabbatino, analysis of relative competency resulted in a rule of
self-denial for the courts in the form of the act of state doctrine, the
doctrine whereby courts of one state refuse to examine the validity
of the acts of another state done within its own territorial jurisdic-
tion.,6 However, the same analysis applied to the matter of repression
of the political emigre reveals a subject significantly better suited to
adjudication than the act of state problem in Sabbatino. In the con-
text of Sabbatino, adjudication of the merits meant by definition the
questioning by a United States court of the legitimacy of the legislative
act of a sovereign state undertaken within its own territorial jurisdic-
tion. Because such questioning seriously risks affront to the foreign
sovereign as a direct challenge to its status as sovereign and may well
provide reason for political reprisal, the analysis of Sabbatino required
a rule of deference.
Adjudication of civil liability for repression of the political emigre
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, on the other
hand, does not provide a foreign regime with an attractive basis to
threaten or undertake reprisal through overt foreign policy. If the
defendants are individuals, the offending government is most likely
to deny responsibility for their actions, as did the government of Chile
in the Letelier affair.67 If the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates
a high degree of involvement by a foreign government, overt reprisal
is nevertheless an unattractive option because there is no publicly
justifiable claim of right to violate another state's internal order and
territorial jurisdiction. There is surely risk of reprisal. But the foreign
government cannot easily press its objection in public fora. It is nota-
ble in this regard that the public thrust of the Chilean regime's reac-
tion to the prosecution of Chilean police agents by the United States
65. See id. at 423-37. The Court noted that Sabbatino presented an issue analogous
to the political question doctrine enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
The Baker formulation highlights the Court's concern for considerations of the relative
competency of the political and judicial branches when confronted with foreign affairs
issues.
66. See 376 U.S. 398, 428, 436-37 (1964). The classic statement of the act of state doc-
trine appears in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (every sovereign must re-
spect independence of every other, and courts of one country will not judge acts of
foreign government done within own territory).
67. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1978, at 5, col. 5 (Chile denies complicity in Letelier
assassination).
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Justice Department for the assassination by bombing of Orlando Le-
telier was not a denunciation of the United States legal process. Al-
though refusing extradition requests, the Chilean regime announced
support for investigation and prosecution.6"
Thus the risk to foreign relations arising out of civil process to
constrain the underground is not the broad risk of reprisal created by
a United States court's evaluation of the public legislative or executive
declarations of a foreign government, as in the act of state cases. The
risk of adverse state reaction to civil liability for repression of the
political emigre is a risk largely limited to effectuation in the clan-
destine corners of intelligence agencies and the secretive diplomatic
encounter where the underground system works.
This specific competence of the judicial branch in the foreign re-
lations context of repression of the emigre is also special in relation to
the political branches. Even assuming executive willingness to under-
take comprehensive law enforcement against the underground system,
adjudication is relatively advantageous because it may constitute a
lesser threat to the foreign relations and intelligence interest than
executive action. Surely it is a far more difficult matter for the ex-
ecutive branch to explain to foreign representatives why the United
States government is prosecuting their agents than to express regret
about the filing of a civil lawsuit. When a civil litigation has been
initiated, the explanation is at worst that the foreign agency has care-
lessly managed to make itself the object of a civil claimant in a United
States court and that the United States government cannot control
the choice of the civil claimant. It may be difficult for a foreign
regime to appreciate the reality of separation of powers and conse-
quent constraint on the executive's ability to control a United States
court. But when a civil suit is filed, the foreign regime can be ex-
pected to understand the dynamic of the public domain. Civil adjudi-
cation is therefore less likely to induce the threat or actuality of re-
prisal than executive action.
On the other hand, civil litigation is more likely to lead to deter-
rence. The civil litigant seeks publicity that the executive would shun.
The civil litigant initiates litigation at anytime, and for reasons in-
dependent of executive intention. Foreign agencies, therefore, are not
able to rest easy on the basis of established executive policy of se-
lective enforcement or non-enforcement of criminal statutes.
68. See id. (Chile to cooperate in investigation); N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1979, at 4, cols.
3-4 (Chile refuses to extradite officials indicted by United States government for Letelier
assassination).
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It also may be noted that civil litigation has the advantage in some
situations of offering the foreign state an opportunity for accommo-
dation of the civil complainant; in effect, responding to his claim on
an individualized basis avoids the foreign policy context and the con-
frontation on general policy grounds that is characteristic of presen-
tation of claims through the State Department. This may have ac-
tually occurred with respect to claims that were to be filed in the
federal courts against the Marcos regime of the Philippines.60
The individualization of relief that is natural to civil process is
indeed generally advantageous for remedy of emigre repression. Al-
though, in the factual context of Sabbatino, the Supreme Court ar-
gued that civil claims affecting international relations often are not
suited to disposition by individualized settlement or adjudication,7°
Justice Harlan's explanation for this position provides a counterpoint
that highlights the relative advantages of individualized adjudication
in the case of the emigre. Harlan stated that as to confiscations by a
foreign regime undertaken within its own territory, adjudication
could have only an "occasional impact,"71 depending on the fortuitous
circumstance of the property in question being brought into this
country,72 and that "[p]iecemeal dispositions ... could seriously inter-
fere with negotiations being carried on by the Executive Branch"73
and could interfere with the executive's objective of achieving "gen-
eral redress."
74
Civil litigation challenging repression of the political emigre, in
contrast, affords opportunity for remedy while executive action is sty-
mied by conflict of interest. The intelligence interest discourages the
achievement of general or even individualized diplomatic redress. In-
dividualized judicial determination can have a deterrent effect through
public reaction in the United States and abroad. Also, a consequence
of adjudication may be pressure on the offending government from
its own population to cease its violation of the internal order of an-
other state.
In sum, analysis of the relative competency of the political branches
and the judiciary to remedy repression of the political emigre reveals
that, despite the adverse impact on the foreign relations interest po-
tentially inherent in any such remedy, the judicial branch enjoys dis-
tinct advantages.
69. See note 54 supra.
70. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-37 (1964).
71. Id. at 431.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 432.
74. Id. at 431.
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C. The Parameters of the Adjudicatory Process
Recognizing that foreign relations interests do not preclude civil
suits and that courts are competent to protect emigre rights only be-
gins the task of defining the appropriate remedy. Further examina-
tion is required to determine the parameters of the adjudicatory
process. Of particular importance is the issue of whether state or
federal courts have jurisdiction over litigation arising from the under-
ground. In addition, it is necessary to determine whether the sub-
stantive legal basis of the cause of action derives from international,
federal, or state law, and whether it is based on statutes or the com-
mon law.
1. Federal Preemption and the Need for Federal Law
The commitment of questions involving foreign relations to the
primary or exclusive authority of the federal government is well es-
tablished. Many decisions by the Supreme Court in a variety of areas
of international concern elaborate this commitment, particularly in
cases involving alien rights and duties and the regulation of aliens.75
It is a commitment well supported by the background 76 and language
77
of the Constitution. When the federal government has acted through
congressional legislation, the Supreme Court has found that supple-
mentary, consistent, or even identical state regulation is preempted
because the federal government occupies the field.7 8 The Court has
held, moreover, that the Constitution itself excludes state intrusion
into foreign affairs of the nation, even when the federal branches have
not acted.79
The reasons that usually require federal preemption, such as the
need for uniformity and the avoidance of the parochialism of state
law,80 apply with special force to the case of the political emigre. If
the underground system is to be made subordinate to the constitutional
order, the requirements of that order must be declared as national
policy so that foreign powers are adequately instructed as to their
conduct with and within the United States. Although it is not neces-
75. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding restrictions on Medicare
coverage of aliens); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (alien inheritance).
76. See THE FEDERALiSr Nos. 3, 4, 5 (J. Jay) (role of federal government in foreign
affairs); id. No. 42 (J. Madison) (same); id. No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (same).
77. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10 (limitations of state power in foreign affairs).
78. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941) (comprehensive alien registration
system precludes exercise of concurrent state authority).
79. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
80. See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption,
67 CoLum. L. REv. 1024, 1042-68 (1967) (discussion of reasons for preemption by federal
government of issues related to foreign affairs).
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sary to concede total and exclusive control to the executive branch
for the nation to "speak with one voice in foreign affairs," it is at
least necessary to concede to this sensible old metaphor that insofar
as adjudicative process touches on the foreign relations of the United
States, its forum and formulation should be federal.
Recognition of the appropriateness of a federal forum does not
close the inquiry. The federal forum does not guarantee that the law
applied will reflect the various national interests at stake. The rules
of decision must be drawn from a source reflecting the national in-
terest. The legal regime to be applied and the experience it contains
should be suited to address repression of the emigre as a distinct
public order problem of national and international dimension.8'
Because Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins8 2 precludes a federal com-
mon law of domestic tort, federal courts hearing alien repression cases
would most likely rely on state tort laws.83 It is often possible to char-
acterize the injury suffered by the political emigre in terms of common
law tort categories, but these embody the public order interests only
of municipal law. For example, the threat which appears to be most
often involved in the intimidation of the emigre-that if the emigre
continues to criticize a foreign regime, harm will come to the emigre
or to his family in the United States or abroad-is a threat which
might awkwardly be fit within present conceptions of "intentional
infliction of mental distress" or other municipal delicts.8 4 However,
tort concepts designed to serve exclusively municipal interests of public
order and civil justice are essentially distorting when applied to injury
81. There is, on the other hand, no reason to seek, and good reason to reject, the
objectives often cited to justify a preference for state law, such as the achievement of a
variety of local experiments and solutions attuned to local conditions, or the operation
of decentralized power centers. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLULJ. L. REv. 489, 490-91 (1954); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1512 (1969).
This point applies to the formulation of international law as well as national law
bearing on the foreign relations of the United States. In the course of the Sabbatino
opinion, Justice Harlan referred to comments by Professor Philip C. Jessup written shortly
after the Erie decision, arguing that Erie should not be applied to rules of international
law. Harlan noted that Professor Jessup "recognized the potential dangers were Erie ex-
tended to legal problems affecting international relations. He cautioned that rules of
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpre-
tations. His basic rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine." 376 U.S.
398, 425 (1964) (footnote omitted); see Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
Applied To International Law, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
82. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
83. The Letelier civil litigation relied on local tort law, which is federal because the
action arose in the District of Columbia. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp.
665, 666 (1980). It is likely, however, that if the assassination had occurred in a state,
state law would have been applied.
84. Among the causes of action alleged in the Letelier case were assault and battery
causing death and negligent transportation and detonation of explosives. Id. These delicts
obscure the international implications of the tortious behavior.
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arising from the underground .1 Such categories fail to provide ac-
curate identification of the injury involved, fail to include considera-
tion of the national interest involved, and are not oriented to provide
deterrence against the underground.
The absence of a recognized federal tort law not only undermines
the purposes of assigning the emigre action to a federal rather than
state forum, but also presents a serious bar to federal court jurisdiction.
If the cause of action is for local tort, the plaintiff and the court must
rely on the diversity jurisdiction. It has long been established, how-
ever, that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot sup-
port an action by an alien plaintiff against an alien defendant.86 Be-
cause this is the likely configuration of emigre suits, the availability
of federal fora for those suits is seriously restricted.
Thus the formulation of a substantive federal law of emigre rights
is essential if adjudication is to constrain the underground. Such a
federal law is necessary for the civil remedy to account adequately for
foreign relations interests, emigre rights, and the legitimacy of foreign
agent activities in the United States. The federal law is also necessary,
given the unavailability of diversity, to establish federal question
jurisdiction.
2. Federal Common Law and International Law
Federal common law, as an acknowledged law-making capacity of
the federal courts, offers potential both for achieving federal question
jurisdiction and case-by-case articulation of rules of judicial decision
affecting the foreign relations of the United States. The Supreme
Court held in 1972, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,8 7 that a case
"arising under" federal common law is an Article III case "arising
under the laws of the United States" and therefore is a federal ques-
tion case within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.88 Seven
years earlier Sabbatino had extended the scope of federal common
law into the area of foreign relations concerns.89
In Sabbatino, Justice Harlan grounded the act of state doctrine on
the existence of judge-created law in areas of federal interest.90 Post-
85. In contrast to the local torts asserted in Letelier, plaintiffs also alleged the tort
of assassination in violation of international law, and assault on an internationally pro-
tected person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). Id. These causes of action would
focus the attention of the court on some of the international aspects of the litigation.
86. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Warren, New Light
on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. Rlv. 49, 79, 93 (1923).
87. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
88. Id. at 98-101.
89. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
90. Id. at 426-28.
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Sabbatino commentators were quick to focus on the fact that Sab-
batino was a declaration of the power of the federal judiciary to
develop federal common law in the area of foreign relations without
the need to justify such judicial legislation in any apparent or pre-
sumptive authorization from the political branches, and that Sabbatino
otherwise went beyond the previous categories of federally created
common law. 91 The precise extent and direction of the new federal
judicial territory was left uncharted in Harlan's opinion, and, despite
the volumes of commentary concerning Sabbatino, there remains much
uncertainty about its scope.92 Sabbatino, taken in the extreme, may
represent the assertion by the Supreme Court of a general common
law jurisdiction of the federal courts in any area of federal interest.
Whatever the wisdom or accuracy of so broad a view, Sabbatino at a
minimum suggests the power of the federal courts to develop a fed-
eral common law of foreign relations that includes the importation
into United States law of principles of international law.9 3
Justice Harlan apparently adopted the so-called "consensus view"
for determining the developing international law norms to be applied
in domestic courts.94 He framed the Court's refusal to adjudge the
91. See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
COLUMi. L. REV. 805, 815-16 (1964); Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 248, 273; Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to
Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 326-27 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Approach]. Prior
to Sabbatino, the development of the post-Erie federal common law, carving areas of
federal interest away from Erie's requirement that federal courts follow the common
law of the states in which they sit, occurred within three general categories. One such
category was comprised of cases concerning the construction or implementation of specific
federal statutes, statutory regimes, or treaties. See Textile Workers Union of America
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367
(1943). Clearfield is generally regarded as the seminal opinion for development of the
post-Erie federal common law based on congressional authorization, although the ground-
ing of Clearfield in federal statute has been subject to question. See Mishkin. The Various-
ness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 828-32 (1957); Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field
of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUm. L. REV. 991 (1953). A second category was comprised
of cases involving the resolution by the federal courts of disputes between states. See, e.g.,
Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963).
The third category of "federal common law" cases concerned the development of a uni-
form law of admiralty carrying out the specific grant to the federal courts under Article
III. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Romero v. Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See generally Stevens, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1950).
92. Over one hundred law review articles and notes concerning Sabbatino have been
printed since 1966. A bibliography of articles prior to 1966 is collected in THE AFTERIATH
OF SAB13ATINO 225-28 (L. Tondel ed. 1965).
93. See Moore, supra note 91, at 273; Jurisdictional Approach, supra note 91, at 334-37.
Other commentators have taken a much more restrictive view of the federal common law
implications of Sabbatino. See Henkin, supra note 91, at 818-19.
94. Justice Harlan apparently followed the view first stated in Falk, Toward a Theory
of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique
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validity of the Cuban nationalization by noting "[t]here are few if
any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be
so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the
property of aliens," 95 also stating, however, that "the greater the de-
gree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of in-
ternational law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding it. . . ."9 Sabbatino does assert that where interna-
tional opinion is not significantly divided the federal courts may
properly adjudge a principle of international law as controlling, and
thereby incorporate international law into United States law in that
area.
Protection of the political emigre does not require the courts to
act in areas of disputed international values such as the legal status
of expropriation. The fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty
could form the foundation of emigre suits. Unlike expropriation, the
principle of territorial sovereignty and the concomitant rule limiting
police jurisdiction to the territorial borders of the acting state are
non-controversial. 97 This foundation would allow courts to develop
substantive legal rules for adjudicating emigre claims within the limits
established in Sabbatino. Rules concerning the right of the state of
asylum to protect the emigre, the right of the emigre to enjoy asylum,
and a consequent duty of the state of asylum to protect the emigre
from the overreaching state of origin could be developed upon the
firm base of territorial sovereignty without involving normative con-
flicts. Thus relying on the consensus view of their role in the inter-
national arena, domestic courts could articulate the normative basis
of a remedy for the emigre.
Although Sabbatino is permissive in the formulation of federal com-
mon law, it does suggest caution. Sabbatino itself ultimately demon-
strates judicial self-restraint and confirms the primacy of the political
branches in foreign affairs. The possible application of international
law appeared only as dictum in the decision, 98 while the court refused
to evaluate a Cuban nationalization decree according to alleged stan-
of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGEPS L. REv. 1 (1961). See Lillich, The
Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L.
9, 32 (1970).
95. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
96. Id.
97. See p. 84 & note 7 supra (widespread consensus on norm of territorial sovereignty).
98. In refusing to evaluate the Cuban nationalization decree, the Sabbatino court
stated "that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it .. " Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
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dards of international law. Sabbatino by itself probably cannot provide
great inspiration for those who dream of domestic courts as indepen-
dent creators of international legal order. The caution and circum-
spection of Harlan's opinion are not the stuff of which such dreams
are made. Furthermore, a federal court would hesitate to create a
private right of action evaluating international conduct without a
statutory invitation from the political branch. Judicial creation of
private rights of action even unrelated to the judicially sensitive area
of foreign relations have generally depended upon statutory founda-
tion, 9 and Sabbatino's specific result of judicial abstention will rein-
force this tendency. Moreover, international law, as it is applied by
domestic courts, remains essentially in the positivist mold as a body
of rules established by the practice of states, declarative of rights and
duties of states, not individuals. Federal courts, with rare exception, 00
have refused to recognize the concept of private remedy for the viola-
tion of international law apart from legislative authorization through
international agreement or internally through municipal legislation. 01
Thus development of a federal judicial remedy for the emigre would
be difficult to achieve without an identifiable statutory basis.
3. The Alien Tort Claims Act
The Congress of the United States long ago enacted a statute which,
at least according to its literal terms, provides the necessary jurisdic-
tion. Section 9 of the first Judiciary Act, 10 2 now section 1350 of title
28, and sometimes labelled the "Alien Tort Claims Act" (Act), gives
99. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 285, 285-89 (1963); Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and Ash: Some
Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392 (1975).
An exception of potential importance is the judicial development of remedies imple-
menting the Bill of Rights, as in an action arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
The plaintiffs in Letelier alleged a cause of action based upon 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1976)
which penalizes actions harming internationally protected persons. Letelier v. Republic
of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 666 (1980). However, even if a private right of action could
be based on this statute, it would not provide a general basis for emigre suits against the
operation of the underground system because the usual victim does not enjoy the special
status of "internationally protected person," a status that pertains primarily to represen-
tatives of foreign governments and international organizations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(4)(B)
(1976).
100. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3929-30 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980)
(federal court has jurisdiction over action for alleged violation of international prohibition
of torture).
101. See, e.g., W. BIsHoP, supra note 46, at 265-68; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FoREIGN
RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 174, 175 (1965).
102. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1976)).
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the federal district courts original jurisdiction over "any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."' 0 3 As a grant of federal
question jurisdiction under Article III, this Act makes possible a suit
between an emigre plaintiff and alien defendant, thus overcoming
the emigre's diversity problem. Moreover, under the terms of section
1350, the standards for assessing the conduct of foreign agents would
be drawn not from the parochialism of municipal law, but from the
public international consensus by which international law is defined.
The Act directs the inquiry to consideration of the violation of public
international norms-the essential offense of the underground system.
The Alien Tort Claims Act thus satisfies the fundamental require-
ments for a jurisdiction within which the emigre can confront the
underground.
Because the "law of nations" is its normative reference, the Act
allows for recognition of emigre claims only when there is public
international consensus. It would assure that repression of the politi-
cal emigre would be focused as an international delict and, therefore,
that adjudication that involves potential offense to a foreign govern-
ment could be defended internationally by reference exclusively to
international values. In other words, the Alien Tort Claims Act af-
fords a model for emigre litigation that is remarkably well attuned
to the consensus view of the role of adjudication in matters touching
on foreign relations that was approved by the Supreme Court in
Sabbatino.
It is likely that the federal courts will have the opportunity to
decide whether the Alien Tort Claims Act provides remedy for the
political emigre. Reference to the Act has appeared in at least two
complaints against underground activities, 04 and the Act has recently
been recognized by the Second Circuit as a tool for importing inter-
national human rights norms into domestic law, generally opening
the way for private remedies for international law violations. 105
There is reason to question, though, whether the Alien Tort Claims
Act is adequate for challenging the underground. A law so old that
103. id.
104. See Complaint, Letelier v. Central Nacional de Informaciones, Civ. No. 78-1477,
at 1 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1978). The Letelier decision finding jurisdiction did not discuss
the applicability of section 1350. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C.
1980). Section 1350 may be rediscovered on appeal, however, if the defect of diversity is
recognized. See note 54 supra.
105. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3935 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980)
(Alien Tort Claims Act opens federal courts for adjudication of rights recognized by inter-
national law).
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it was part of the first bill before the first Senate of the United States
may well embody original intentions and subsequent colorations that
take it outside the logic and promise of its literal terms.
The reported cases discussing section 1350 jurisdiction have never
touched on the underground, and indeed have not ventured very far
in specific application of the Act. For the most part, discussion of the
Act has been characterized by mysterious reference to unknown ori-
gins, and an unwillingness to venture any innovative application. Judge
Friendly recently summed up almost two hundred years of the judicial
experience by observing, "[t]his old but little used section is a kind
of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Ju-
diciary Act, . . .no one seems to know whence it came."' 106
The statute has appeared in few more than a dozen reported cases. 10 7
It has been applied to create private rights in connection with specific
treaty violations.108 But it has been used successfully for jurisdiction
for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations only twice. In
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,0 9 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found torture perpetrated abroad under color of official authority
actionable under section 1350.110 The second case, Abdul-Rahman
Omar Adra v. Clift,"' a child custody case, involved the international
tort of taking a child from country to country by falsifying the child's
nationality on the mother's passport.112 In addition, one Attorney
General's opinion discussing the statute indicated a link with prin-
ciples of territorial sovereignty by suggesting that an international
tort under the Act would arise from the changing of a channel of a
river that functioned as a boundary between the United States and
Mexico. x" 3 Finally, in another relatively recent case, Nguyen Da Yen
v. Kissinger,"4 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, though
finding jurisdiction on other grounds, in dicta noted that Alien Tort
Claims Act jurisdiction may be appropriate to hear alien human rights
claims against state agencies for actions across national borders."0
The cases have stated a general standard for applying the Act. This
"test" of section 1350 jurisdiction was first articulated by a federal
106. ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
107. See Annot., 34 A.L.R. Fed. 388 (1977) (briefly summarizing case law).
108. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
109. No. 79-6090 (2d Cir. 1980).
110. Id. slip op. at 3913.
111. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
112. Id. at 864-65.
113. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252 (1907).
114. 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
115. Id. at 1201 n.13.
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district court in Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder,"6 and was later
utilized by other courts, particularly the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals." 7 The Lopes court said:
[T]he phrase "in violation of the law of nations," . . means, inter
alia, at least a violation by one or more individuals of those stan-
dards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states
or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by
those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.18s
Although this standard remains indefinite, courts have interpreted
the phrase "standards ... used by ... states for their common good
and/or in dealings inter se" to require a finding of possible impact on
the foreign relations of the United States."1 9 This interpretation im-
plies that the Alien Tort Claims Act requires a reversal of the usual
judicial tendency. The likelihood of foreign policy implications be-
comes reason for activism of the federal courts rather than reason for
judicial deference or exclusion.1
20
In Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra,121 the court noted that a reason for
upholding section 1350 jurisdiction is to provide a federal forum for
an alien claim as an alternative to action in the state courts. The court
stressed that "[t]he importance of foreign relations to our country today
cautions federal courts to give weight to such considerations and not to
decline jurisdiction given by an Act of Congress unless required to do
so by dominant considerations."'12 2 In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court
stated a similar view. The Supreme Court specifically referred to the
Alien Tort Claims Act as support for its determination that the act
of state doctrine was to be treated as a matter of federal law, citing
section 1350 as among the statutory and constitutional provisions "re-
flecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with for-
116. 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
117. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978);
ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Valanga v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
118. 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
119. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978);
Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
120. The aftermath of Sabbatino resolves any doubt concerning congressional authority
to order the courts to adjudicate an issue despite potential foreign affairs impact. Con-
grcss enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment to require judicial resolution of the validity
of confiscations according to principles of international law. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1976). The amendment was applied as controlling the ultimate result in Sabbatino. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), af 'd, 383 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
121. Abdul Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
122. Id. at 865.
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eign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of international
significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions."' 123
In sum, courts considering the application of the Alien Tort Claims
Act in recent times have determined that the Act provides jurisdiction
where an alien claim importantly bears on the foreign relations of
the United States because the alleged violation of standards for con-
duct between nations is involved requiring a federal forum. This in-
terpretation was foreshadowed by statements of the framers of the Act
and eighteenth century commentators on international law. These
statements reflect the concern that recognition of alien claims is nec-
essary to preserve the peaceful international relations of the United
States. 1
24
Commonly appearing in the treatises and the statements of the
framers is the related concern that injury to an alien can constitute
injury to the foreign state of which the alien is a citizen.12 5 However,
the presence of this concern does not confirm that the framers in-
tended to protect the political emigre who suffers at the hands of
agents of the state of nationality. Indeed, the more extreme view in
which alien rights are tied exclusively to the pleasure of the state of
citizenship would argue against interpretation of section 1350 to pro-
tect the emigre.
But this view is a significantly more positivistic perspective than
probably dominated the thinking of the framers in the eighteenth
century.12 6 Certain influential treatise writers perceived the law of
nations as involving relationships not only between state and state,
123. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
124. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (federal judiciary ought to have juris-
diction over all cases in which foreign citizens are parties because denial or perversion of
justice to foreign citizens may cause war).
125. See H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHT OF WAR AND PEACE 136-37 (1964) (Ist ed. 1598); E.
VATTEL, supra note 44, at 144-45 (whoever abuses citizen indirectly offends citizen's state;
sovereign who refuses to punish offender becomes responsible for offense).
126. The later so-called positivist view of international law is exemplified by Oppen-
helm:
Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, and
not of individual human beings, States solely and exclusively are the subjects of
International Law. This means that the Law of Nations is a law for the interna-
tional conduct of States, and not of their citizens .... An individual human being
... is never directly a subject of International Law.
I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 38, § 13, at 18-19. Oppenheim summarizes the positivist
catechism, "But what is the real position of individuals in International Law, if they are
not subjects thereof? The answer can only be that they are objects of the Law of Nations."
Id. § 290, at 344.
Recent commentators have challenged the doctrine that human rights in international
law are limited by the concepts of nationality and the subject-object dichotomy. See, e.g.,
P. JEssup, suPra note 37, at 68; H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
6-12 (1st ed. 1950); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 40.
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but also between the individual and the state. Grotius perceived the
connection between individual rights and the law of nations as bearing
on peaceful international relations. His argument that "the mutual
tie of kinship among men" justified and frequently caused warfare to
protect the rights of others illuminates the congressional perception
that federal jurisdiction over alien claims would help preserve the
"peace of nations."'127
Emigre rights were viewed among the natural rights of man included
within the law of nations. Vattel argued that the law of nature re-
quires a right of emigration and protection of the emigre alien by
the state granting asylum.' 28 This is remarkable because Vattel strong-
ly promoted the sovereignty and primacy of states in international
law.'2 9 Yet even Vattel insisted on a right of emigration so strong as
to give an individual a right to seek protection within the state of
asylum against the state of nationality.130
The conclusions of Vattel and the other commentators thus indi-
cate that Congress might have intended section 1350 to afford aliens
protection apart from their state of nationality and to grant sanctuary
in a federal forum against foreign interests.
Of course, the intention of the framers of this statute is neither cer-
tain nor dispositive of its interpretation. The meaning of the law of
nations as applied in federal law is evolutionary 1 1 and the original
intention, whatever it was, can only suggest the meaning to be given
today. Contemporary experience, however, confirms the eighteenth
century insight into the inevitable and profound connection between
human rights and international relations. Violations of human rights
are an obvious source and stimulus of international tension, and re-
pression of the political emigre is potentially an extremely provoca-
tive aspect of contemporary violation of human rights. United States
experience with Iran and Chile demonstrates that the tension occurs
127. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 125, at 504, 582.
128. See E. VATTEL, supra note 44, at 95-98.
129. See id. at 1-8 (states are free and equal sovereigns; law of nations pertains to re-
lations of states).
130. See id. at 95-96 (circumstances in which citizen has right to emigrate; sources of
rights; limited duty of other sovereigns to aid would-be emigre).
Vattel's endorsement of emigre rights is of added significance because many early
American statesmen apparently consulted it as an authoritative source on the law of
nations. Benjamin Franklin, for example, reported its use at the Continental Congress
in 1775. See 2 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 64
(F. Wharton ed. 1889); F. RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT xiii (1975)
(Vattel's The Law of Nations met with extraordinary success upon publication and was
foremost guide to international law and practice).
131. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3921 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980)
(courts must interpret law of nations not as it was in 1789, but as it exists today).
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regardless of the ideologies involved. Both in the case of Iran, whose
new government was alienated by American tolerance of repression,' 32
and in the case of Chile, whose repressive regime objected to the
extradition of its officials who hired assassins, 133 the pacific relations
of states have suffered.
Furthermore, current trends in international law concerning the
protection of human rights have certainly revitalized many of the con-
cerns voiced by eighteenth century treatise writers. Individual rights
have once again been recognized as the subject of protection of inter-
national law, even entitling persons to claims against the state of
nationality.134 Thus, whether viewed in the present light or that con-
temporaneous with its drafting, section 1350 should be read as a con-
gressional authorization for the federal courts to provide protection
for alien rights, even when conflicting with the objectives of the state
of nationality.
4. A Statute-Based, Federal Common Law of International Tort
Defining the precise parameters of the international tort of emigre
repression is well within the competency of the federal courts. They
will decide when particular intimidation is sufficiently serious to con-
stitute violation of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and
emigre rights. It should not be difficult to identify as clear violations
the broad category of foreign agent activity that composes the core
and primary substance of the underground. The delict can be defined
essentially as occurring when the political emigre is threatened with
or suffers damage to himself or family caused by the activities in the
United States of foreign agents, particularly when perpetrated to stifle
expression of political views. If threats are communicated only from
abroad, or relate only to harm to family residing in the emigre's
country of origin, the case is harder, and becomes occasion for the
courts to articulate new conclusions concerning limitations on the
extraterritorial application of United States law and the due process
requirements of "minimum contacts."' 13 This is a rather conventional
132. See note 60 supra.
133. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1979, at 4, cols. 3-4.
134. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3927-30 (2d Cir. June 30,
1980) ("international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own
governments") (citing HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS I (Comm. Print 1980) (international consensus that governments owe their citizens
basic human rights protections)).
135. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 3939-41 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980),
a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted some of the problems of
extraterritoriality in cases arising under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The court found
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task for the federal courts.'38 Moreover, the activity that comprises
the essential substance of the underground presents no such ques-
tions because the foreign agencies threatening and causing harm in
the United States do so while physically present within the territory
of the United States.
Providing a remedy for the political emigre also does not require
of the federal courts any initiative or performance beyond their es-
tablished capacities in the development of statute-based federal com-
mon law. Indeed, the federal courts are better equipped to develop
a legal regime protective of the alien than they were to develop certain
now-established areas of federal common law.
An instructive contrast is the federal common law enterprise that
began with the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills."7 In the Lincoln Mills case the Court upheld sec-
tion 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act 1 38 as a grant of jurisdiction to the
federal courts to regulate the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements, finding in section 301(a) a mandate to fashion a federal
common law of labor contract." 91 The opinion has been trenchantly
that Congress had conferred subject matter jurisdiction for violations of international
law, such as torture resulting in death, even when the act occurred in a foreign state.
Id. However, the court left open the question of whether the law of state of the occur-
rence or of the forum state controlled.
136. The extraterritorial application of United States law is generally tested by the
occurrence of "conduct" or "effects" in the United States resulting from the prohibited
activity. The application of the "conduct" and "effects" tests in areas such as securities
regulation and antitrust indicates that the extraterritorial application of United States
law to protect an emigre while resident in the United States from any of the intimidation
that has been orchestrated from abroad could survive those tests, and the "minimum
contacts" due process test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
as well. See K. Bmrws-r, supra note 57, at 65-74 (1958) (jurisdiction over foreign acts
having effects in United States); Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities
Fraud, 89 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1976); Developments in the Extraterritorial Reach of United
States Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 313 (1976).
The due process test of International Shoe "requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)). In light of the violation of national and international legal principles in-
volved in repression of the emigre, it would seem difficult to conclude that the assertion
of in personam jurisdiction to protect the resident emigre from intimidation in the United
States caused by threats of violence from abroad would offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
137. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
139. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
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criticized as presuming, without adequate foundation, that Congress
intended to initiate an important shift in the relation of the states
and the federal government, and to authorize the creation of a fed-
eral common law of labor contract in the context of enforcement of
an arbitration agreement, where adjudication is a process of dubious
value. 140 Moreover, the criticism is that the Court took this initiative
in Lincoln Mills without being able to provide adequate direction
for the federal courts as to the sources for the new federal common
law of labor contract.
1 41
Similar concerns do not apply to development of a federal common
law of international tort to protect the emigre. No shift of function
of state and federal government would be involved. State law does
not address the problem of the underground as such. Also, there would
be no conflict with an ongoing and vital process of dispute resolution,
as the critics of -Lincoln Mills argue is inherent in the imposition of
adjudication on arbitration and collective bargaining. 142 Adjudication
of emigre claims instead can fill a void where diplomacy ideally ought
to function, but in fact does not.
Perhaps the most striking difference between the founding of fed-
eral common law in Lincoln Mills and the development of federal
common law to protect the emigre relates to the available sources of
law and the available legislative direction. Section 301(a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, although declaring the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to hear claims concerning collective bargaining agreements, says noth-
ing concerning whether state or federal law should apply. The Alien
Tort Claims Act, in contrast, instructs the federal courts to fashion
a federal common law by directing them to apply the "law of nations."
Application of the "law of nations" requires the evolutionary and
ambulatory process of the common law because the law of nations
originates in the ever-evolving consensus of states. The statute's refer-
ence to the "law of nations" bespeaks a firm tradition, epitomized by
the classic declaration of Justice Gray in The Paquete Habana143
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction,
140. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957). See also Wellington, Labor and the Federal System,
26 U. CHi. L. REv. 542, 556-61 (1959); Note, supra note 81, at 1531-35; Comment, The
Emergent Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: A Survey of the Law under Section
301, 28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 707, 707-08 (1961).
141. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 140, at 23-25.
142. See id.
143. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination."'
144
The Supreme Court has upheld the authority of the federal courts
to use the process of the common law to incorporate international
law as United States law even where there is reason for judicial re-
straint that would not pertain to the international tort of emigre re-
pression. In Ex parte Quirin14 5 and United States v. Smith,146 the
Court upheld statutes penalizing violations of international law. The
Court found that even without any definition of "law of nations," the
statutes provided sufficient notice to potential offenders. 1 47 The basis
for the application and development of the law of nations by the fed-
eral courts is even stronger when Congress authorizes civil liability for
violation of the law of nations, and due process rights of criminal de-
fendants are not involved.
In comparative terms, indeed, the development of a federal com-
mon law of international tort to protect the emigre would be a rela-
tively conservative development within the greater body of federal
common law. Decisions such as Lincoln Mills demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has launched the development of federal common law
in areas of federal interest on very uncertain foundations with little
guidance for the federal judicial system.148 The task of the federal
courts in articulating federal common law generally begins with much
greater uncertainty than would burden the courts in articulating pro-
tection of the emigre from physical and mental abuse by foreign
agents. As has been suggested above, this wrong is susceptible of de-
lictual definition.
49
Finally, it is clear that the existence of a statutory grant on which
to base the development of a federal common law of international
tort provides the courts with a solid bridge between national law
and international law. The availability of the Alien Tort Claims Act
makes it possible for the courts to build private rights on international
norms without any impediment arising from the interstate nature of
international law.'50
144. Id. at 700.
145. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
146. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
147. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153, 159-61 (1820).
148. See Note, supra note 81, at 1532; cf. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 383, 407 (1964) (range of post-Erie development
of federal common law).
149. See pp. 96-97 supra.
150. Some courts have failed to distinguish the limits on private rights enforceable
under international law from the use of domestic legislation, such as the Alien Tort
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Even within the strictures of positivism, the existence of a statutory
grant renders tired cliches about the purely interstate nature of inter-
national law completely irrelevant. Congress, acting within the limits
of its Article I power, can of course authorize a private right of action
as a declaration of municipal law. Congress also can authorize the
federal courts to apply common law. This is the import of the body
of federal common law that Harlan pointed to in Sabbatino.151 A
civil remedy for the political emigre challenging conduct that violates
norms of public international law is wholly compatible with the leg-
islative and judicial power of the United States, for the conjunction
of such power has generally functioned both in the development of
federal common law and in the incorporation of international law
into United States law.
III. The Reality of Emigre Litigation
The value of the international tort model as an instrument of pro-
tection for the emigre will be tested ultimately by lawyers meeting
the conventional challenges of litigation. Of critical concern, therefore,
is the adaptability of the international tort model to the requirements
of a lawsuit.
Often the potential plaintiff will be reluctant to bring suit. The
emigre may perceive the risk of retaliation to self, family, or associates
as too great. However, emigre litigation most likely will proceed de-
spite these inhibitions, particularly because of the protection public
exposure will provide.
Most importantly, the critical measure of the success of the inter-
national tort model as the means for the imposition of substantial
constraint on the underground will not be the number of lawsuits.
The advancement of a minor number of lawsuits of major notoriety
can achieve the objective of constraint. The Letelier litigation dem-
onstrates that it is the nature of the emigre suit to generate public
attention because of its political aspect.15 2 Civil litigation and the
Claims Act, to incorporate international norms into domestic law. See Dreyfus v. Von
Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) (because law of nations
is relative to states it is not self-executing and does not vest individuals with rights). Elen
from the positivist perspective, the existence of a statutory grant such as section 1350
provides the basis for deriving individual rights from international law.
151. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964).
152. The Letelier litigation has been and continues to be the subject of frequent press
stories. See, e.g., Klement, Foreign Victims Find U.S. Forums, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 13, 1980, at
8, cols. 1-3 (Chilean government subject to suit for alleged participation in Letelier as-
sassination); J. DINGS & S. LANDAU, supra note 15 (detailing Letelier assassination and
aftermath).
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exposure it entails is a clear and present risk run by the foreign
agencies operating in the United States. The courts, providing civil
relief on the international tort model, can "up the ante" for in-
timidation.
A. The Problem of Proof
The attorney who seeks a remedy for the political emigre will con-
front serious problems of proof. Because the injurious activities are
clandestine and often carried out by organizations for which secrecy
is a professional virtue, proof is naturally difficult to obtain.
The specific nature and extent of the problems of proof will depend
largely upon what the courts delineate as the elements of the cause
of action. Under the international tort model, when the foreign state
or its agency is named as defendant, it should not be necessary to
produce an individual defendant to demonstrate that injury has oc-
curred as a result of efforts by a foreign government to stifle criticism
or otherwise repress the emigre. Also, "a tort which violates the law of
nations" could be established if individual defendants are available,
even if it cannot be proven that they acted as agents for a foreign
government. It would appear sufficient for individual liability that
individuals, even on their own initiative, cause injury in their at-
tempt to further foreign police interests. This may be sufficient for
liability of the foreign government as well, particularly given the
ample precedent under United States law for finding accountability
where an agent has acted under "color of law" of a governmental
authority, even if in violation of the law or instruction of that gov-
ernmental authority.'5 3 Finally, it should not be necessary to prove
that physical harm actually occurred to the emigre or to relatives or
associates. There is nothing innovative about the notion that threat
of harm is sufficient to constitute tortious injury. 54
Plaintiffs can probably meet these burdens of proof, even if with
some difficulty. The Senate Report chronicling repressive activities
in the United States of numerous foreign intelligence organizations
indicates that foreign agents leave tracks and "blow cover" notwith-
standing the ongoing efforts of the executive branch to prevent dis-
closure.1 55 Similar evidence can be found by those with an incentive
to discover it.
153. See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
154. See W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 37-41 (tort law protects interest in freedom
from fear of harmful contact).
155. See Washington Post, Aug. 19, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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B. Sovereign Immunity
Who will the emigre sue? The suit will name individual defendants
if they can be found with assets in the United States and are not
beneficiaries of diplomatic immunity. 156 The emigre suit is also likely
to join as defendant the foreign state or its agency, both to achieve
compensation and to deter future injury by maximizing embarrass-
ment of the foreign predator. Thus the issue of sovereign immunity
will commonly arise in emigre litigation.
The controlling law is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976. ' That Act provides two exceptions to foreign sovereign im-
munity that could permit an emigre suit to proceed against the for-
eign state or its agency. One is the exception for an action based on
"commercial activity" having a nexus with the United States.5 s Oc-
casionally, the foreign predator acts through forms of commerce. For
example, associates of President Marcos of the Philippines obtained
the assets of Filipino emigres living in the United States at "bargain"
prices under commercial contract induced by threats concerning the
safety of family remaining in the Philippines.'5 The second excep-
tion to immunity is more generally applicable to the circumstances
of emigre repression. This is the exception for noncommercial torts
found in section 1605(a)(5).
160
Congress surely did not consider political intimidation when it ap-
proved any section of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The
legislative committee report provides a mundane explanation of the
noncommercial torts exception: "[t]he purpose . . . is to permit the
victim of a traffic accident or other noncommercial tort to maintain
an action against the foreign state to the extent otherwise provided
156. Persons with diplomatic status have been the agents of intimidation. See Anderson,
Yugoslav Secret Agent Leaves U.S., Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1979, § B, at 17, col. 3
(activities of consul general of Yugoslav Consulate in San Francisco).
157. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976). Sovereign im-
munity in the United States is based on considerations of comity and fairness, and may
be withdrawn by the courts or legislature accordingly. National City Bank v. Republic
of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955); The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136-37, 143-44 (1812).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
159. Butterfield, Once-Powerful Families in the Philippines Lose Heavily Under Gov-
ernment Pressures, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
160. Under this exception a state or its agency is not immune:
[I]n any case ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or
of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope
of his office or employment; . . ..
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
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by law." 01 However, the district court in the Letelier civil litigation
nevertheless adopted a "plain meaning" approach and concluded that
the language of section 1605(a)(5) and the legislative comment es-
tablished an applicable exception to immunity. 1 62 The court also
specifically rejected the view that the activity complained of should
be analyzed in terms of the traditional distinction of "private act" (jus
gentionis) and "public act" (jus imperii), as that distinction has been
elaborated by the courts in pre-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
adjudication.' 1 3 The Letelier court found that the public-private act
distinction had not been applied in the cases with any logical con-
sistency, and that Congress intended the sovereign immunity legisla-
tion to be the exclusive standard in resolving sovereign immunity
questions.
0 4
The district court was undoubtedly correct in finding that the
noncommercial tort exception is broad enough to allow relief for the
political emigre. However, it failed to reach the policy issues that
ultimately must be addressed for any satisfactory interpretation of the
legislation. Indeed, in reaching its result the court would have been
better advised to follow the traditional public-private act distinction.
For notwithstanding the difficulties of this distinction, it is clear that
sovereign immunity for a public act has never included immunity for
an act of foreign police power extending into the forum state. Sov-
ereign immunity applies only when "public act" means an act legiti-
mated by public process, not when agencies of political power operate
secretly and deliberately to violate the sovereignty of the forum state.
The court failed to perceive the foreign agent activity as underground
activity and therefore activity impossible to legitimate by public law
doctrine such as sovereign immunity. By adopting a literalist approach
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the Letelier court did not
consider the relevant domestic and international interests. 1 5
Sovereign immunity may become the precise battleground for re-
161. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6620.
162. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1980).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 672.
165. In declining to apply the exemption for harm arising from discretionary activities
of a foreign sovereign, the court did touch upon some of the international law constraints
on sovereign conduct. See id. at 673 (government has no discretion to plot assassination);
cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1976) (exemption from liability for discretionary functions).
The Letelier case may be early indication that adjudication is moving towards an in-
ternational tort concept. The Letelier court, however, abandoned the enterprise with con-
siderable distance remaining, and never brought public international law principles into
focus as the substantive and jurisdictional basis on which the complaint should have been
sustained.
The Yale Law Journal
solving the issue of the relative competence of the political and ju-
dicial branches to respond to repression of the political emigre. Al-
though Congress declared that the purpose of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 was "to transfer the determination of sov-
ereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch,"'16
the executive will undoubtedly continue to communicate with the
courts to raise immunity on extra-legal grounds in politically sensitive
cases. Remarks made by the executive during the deliberations on
the legislation are suggestive of future executive initiative of this
kind.1 67 Moreover, notwithstanding the reasons sovereign immunity
determinations have now been relegated to the judicial branch, cases
inevitably arise that appear to present a political crisis requiring po-
litical solution. In light of the judicial response to such cases prior
to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,0 8 the courts
may yet recognize an executive prerogative to stymie private remedy
for a political emigre when the executive is willing to assert itself in
favor of a grant of sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court in effect provided just such a "safety valve"
for the expression of executive interest in the context of Alien Tort
Claims Act litigation. In O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke,'0 0 the Court
concluded that, because the Congress and the executive ratified the
alleged tort, a "tort in violation of the law of nations" had not oc-
curred.1
70
The provision of a safety valve for diplomatic initiative does not
diminish the importance of adjudication for constraint of the under-
ground. Rather, it recognizes that although the executive branch rarely
constrains the underground through publicly recognized diplomatic
processes, when important political considerations prompt the execu-
tive to act, the courts should step aside. By making civil process avail-
166. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 161, at 7, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Navs at
6606.
167. See Letter from the Legal Adviser of the State Department to the Attorney
General (Nov. 2, 1976), reprinted in 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 649-50 (1976) (State Depart-
ment interested in construction of new statute and, should a court "misconstrue" statute,
"may well have an interest in making its views on the legal issues known to an ap-
pellate court"). Executive expression on legal issues may provide the vehicle for future
political intrusion by the executive branch. Justice White's concurrence in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 & n.18 (1976), though written
shortly before passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, nevertheless sug-
gests the legitimacy of such a course for the executive by approving a balancing of execu-
tive foreign policy interests and private party compensation interests.
168. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710, 718-26 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd,
295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (Department of State request for immunity given controlling
force by court).
169. 209 U.S. 45 (1908).
170. Id. at 52.
114
Vol. 90: 78, 1980
Emigre Repression
able to vindicate emigre rights, courts will force the executive to
assert publicly that certain cases require political control. Consequent-
ly, the executive will be compelled to work within legitimate processes
and not in the subterranean chambers of the underground.
Justice Harlan noted, in the foreign confiscation context of Sab-
batino, that forcing declaration of interest by the executive can in
itself impair the political interest. 171 However, when the subject for
negotiation is not foreign confiscation, but repression of the emigre,
and involves possible executive complicity in conduct subversive of
domestic and international legal order, a requirement that the ex-
ecutive declare its position before civil litigation can be stopped be-
comes constructive. Because the executive is motivated to cooperate
in the illicit conduct, a check is necessary.
It is unlikely that the executive will approach the courts to deny
civil remedy to the political emigre. It is especially unlikely to do so
without seeking to mollify the emigre. The unavoidable publicity
attendant upon support of sovereign immunity within civil process
constitutes an important disincentive. The reluctance of the executive,
and indeed of the foreign state, to appear in alliance against the com-
plaining emigre would be rarely overcome. The appearance of alli-
ance is too close to the reality of the underground and its need for
concealment. In general, the optimism expressed in the legislative
committee report on the sovereign immunity legislation about the
presumed advantages to be gained by judicial control would be vindi-
cated more certainly in emigre litigation than perhaps any other area
of litigation touching on foreign relations.'7"' The foreign governments
involved would be extremely restrained in appealing to or pressuring
the executive, and the judiciary rarely if ever would be requested to
assume the uncomfortable and unseemly position of bowing before
the executive's assertion of sovereign immunity adverse to the emigre
plaintiff.
C. The Enforcement of Emigre Right
The viability of the emigre suit will depend ultimately upon en-
forcement of its result. Despite availability of proof and avoidance of
the bar of sovereign immunity, both motivation and success in the
171. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436 (1964) (litigation
may force government to take position that does not serve its diplomatic interests).
172. The report stated the hope that through passage of the Act, "[t]he Department
of State would be freed from pressures from foreign governments to recognize their
immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness
of the Department to support that immunity." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 161, at
7, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6606.
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emigre suit, as in any litigation, will be largely determined by the
potential and reality of enforcement of the right that is recognized
through civil process.
Enforcement of a money judgment does not present special diffi-
culty if individual agents or organizations involved in repression of
the emigre have assets in the United States. Such assets are more likely
to be reachable and considerable when individuals or organizations
are employed by a foreign government to use commercial activities
established in the United States as "cover" to accomplish intimida-
tion. Execution is also especially promising if business organizations
operating in the United States, although not serving directly as agents
of intimidation, have knowingly acted to assist the foreign agent ac-
tivity. For example, under certain circumstances, United States banks
may be liable for having helped finance contracts that their officers
know have been secured by extortion.173
It should be noted that with respect to execution, sovereign im-
munity is again a consideration. When a defendant is named as the
agent of a foreign state, that defendant typically will deny relation-
ship to the foreign state if the denial can have any measure of cred-
ibility. But if the defendant normally operates as an agency of the
foreign state, and cannot deny the relationship, then it will seek not
only immunity from jurisdiction, but also immunity from execution.
It was a prevailing view in the United States prior to the passage
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 that, notwithstand-
ing the lack of jurisdictional immunity in a particular case, property
of foreign states and their official agencies was absolutely immune
from execution.17 4 However, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, immunity from execution has now been qualified to conform
generally to the provisions governing jurisdictional immunity. A for-
eign state as such retains immunity from execution on its property,
except where the particular property "is or was used for the commer-
cial activity upon which the claim is based."' 75 The property of
173. Although courts apparently have not considered lender liability in such situations,
a related case indicates the possibility of limited recovery in certain instances of ex-
tortion. Cf. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211, 220-21 (5th Cir.
1964) (lender liable for conversion for funds received from sale of stolen oil). The most
promising situation for recovery would arise when a lender gained control of extorted
property, for example, through foreclosure on security for a loan. See id. In such cir-
cumstances knowledge on the part of bank officers would apparently be irrelevant. See
id. at 220 & n.27.
174. See H.R. RaP. No. 1487, suPra note 161, at 27, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6626.
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976).
116
Vol. 90: 78, 1980
Emigre Repression
"agencies and instrumentalities"'- 76 of the foreign state, though, is
substantially more vulnerable. Pursuant to section 1610(b) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the property of an agency or in-
strumentality is subject to claims not only for commercial activity,
but also for noncommercial tort if it is engaged in commercial activity
in the United States.177 Thus, execution is allowed whenever the
exceptions to jurisdictional immunity provide the opportunity for
emigre litigation, and this includes the most significant exception,
the exception for noncommercial tort. Furthermore, execution against
the property of an "agent or instrumentality" is allowed against any
of its property, whether commercial or noncommercial, and whether
or not used for the "activity upon which the claim is based."'1
7 8
Maintaining the availability of property of a foreign state or an
''agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state for execution may be
problematic because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act effectively
forecloses prejudgment attachment. 7 9 But given the continuing inter-
est of foreign states and their commercial agencies in the United States
marketplace, and the difficulty of removing assets,. 8 0 prejudgment
attachment is probably not critical to successful execution.''
Thus there is opportunity for actual dollar recovery in the emigre
suit. However, to view damage recovery or, some form of equitable
order,18 2 as the complete measure of remedy for the emigre is to
misperceive the value of a court's judgment against the underground.
The appropriate analogy from domestic law is civil rights litigation
or, more generally, litigation to remedy dignitary injury and injury
to the personality, where a favorable judgment though expressed in
176. See id. § 1603(b) (defining agency or instrumentality of foreign state).
177. See id. § 1610(b).
178. Id. Although a foreign state cannot be liable for punitive damages, such damages
are allowed against an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state. See id. § 1606.
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976); H.R..REP. No. 1487, supra note 161, at 26-27, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6625-26 (§ 1609 designed to eliminate necessity for pre-
judgment attachment, thus easing conduct of foreign affairs).
180. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1976) (statement of Michael Marks Cohen).
181. Removal would most likely be a problem, whether or not related to the emigre
suit, where a general breakdown in relations with a foreign state has occurred. The
schism between the United States and Iran, resulting in the need for a freeze on Iranian
assets in the United States, provides a recent and dramatic example.
182. A court might grant an injunction where a certain person or organization is
identified as responsible for continuing intimidation, and is subject to the contempt
power. Penalty by fine could be utilized when the defendant does not enjoy diplomatic
immunity and the Act does not limit execution on a judgment. See H.R. REP. No. 1487,
supra note 161, at 22, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6620-21.
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dollars may represent its greatest value to the litigant as a symbolic
vindication and judicial declaration of applicable norms affecting
future conduct. Judgment against the underground may have the
greatest value as a spotlight on the underground, providing present
safety and inducing withdrawal of the underground by amplifying the
risk of continued exposure.
The emigre confronting the underground surely seeks such non-
economic objectives, quite apart from the pleasure of collection. The
resources and motivation to bring forward the emigre claim generally
arise out of the desire to rally round a dissident flag. The value of
political achievement through civil process does not depend upon find-
ing and collecting the property of foreign agents. The nonpecuniary
reasons for seeking a money judgment are perhaps the reasons of
greatest importance, because through such judgments the courts can
articulate rules constraining the underground and, consequently, in-
spire other battles for emigre redress.
IV. Conclusion-A Question of Conviction
To appreciate fully the societal value of an emigre right to litigate
against the underground requires a certain detachment from contem-
porary debate about the relation of domestic courts and international
legal order. The debate is too ideological, too polarized to be instruc-
tive concerning the sinister reality of repression of the emigre. Advo-
cates of domestic courts as the creators of international legal order
tend to pursue their vision in metaphysical terms, offering elevated,
self-enclosed "world order" systems.'8 3 "Realists" see any suggestion
of a constructive role for domestic courts in fashioning international
order as misguided interference in an arena belonging exclusively to
politics and diplomacy.'8 4 The pragmatic and selective view that Har-
lan put forward in Sabbatino is disregarded, and neither side of the
debate can be very responsive to the immediate need for a remedy
for the unrecognized problem of emigre repression.
Outside the confines of this debate, the need to remedy foreign
agent repression of the emigre continues and intensifies. The phe-
nomenon of emigre repression has become a prominent and pervasive
problem in part due to the ever-increasing internationalization of
national political struggles. The continuing failure to address this
183. See M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL, 9- L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1980).
184. See Lipson, International Law, in 8 F. GREENSTEIN & N. POLSBY, HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 415-35 (1975).
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foreign agent activity increasingly threatens national and international
legal order.8 5
The international tort model provides a basis for remedy that can
develop through the empirical dynamic of the common law, yet avoids
the parochialism that is characteristically the failing of domestic ad-
judication as an instrument of international legal order. It avoids the
problem of parochialism by relying upon international law as the
source of standards for defining the delict. The international tort
model is promising as a means to constrain the underground system
because it rests on legal norms supported by international consensus.
In addition, the international tort model allows for a remedy that is
sensitive to foreign policy interests. Finally, it is a remedy that can
be based on existing legislation, and it is compatible with the present
American law of sovereign immunity.
Any reason to doubt that courts can restrain the underground sys-
tem has less to do with legal questions than with questions about the
political climate in the United States. Today there is a popular cry
to "unleash the CIA" that Congress and the President have responded
to."' To the extent that American political culture is dominated by
the fears underlying this outcry, the need to leash the underground
is likely to be ignored.
Constraining the underground is also difficult because the imme-
diate beneficiary would be the alien. Common prejudice against the
alien will bear on the availability of the remedy. Moreover, certain
statements by the Supreme Court seem to suggest that accommodation
of alien rights to the national political interest is unimportant, that,
in fact, aliens' rights can be sacrificed by the political branches as
they see fit.'
5 7
But such comments taken out of context are misleading. Even in
185. The most glaring examples of growing dangers of emigre repression are the
Libyan and Iranian persecutions. See The Times (London), June 14, 1980, at 1, col. 4
(Libyan leader announces that agents sent to foreign states to assassinate political emigres);
N.Y. Timcs, Apr. 12, 1980, at 5, col. 4 (same); id., July 23, 1980, at I, col. 5 (Iranian goN-
einment claims ciedit for murder of former Shah's press attache living in United States).
Thsce episodes demonstrate that the repression is not confined to any particular political
persuasion.
186. See 126 CONG. REc. HI0,047-48 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Weiss)
(passage of Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1981 will facilitate CIA covert
activities and reduce CIA accountability); id. at H10,064-65 (House passes Intelligence
Authorization Act).
187. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (responsibility for regulating re-
lationship between United States and "alien visitors" committed to political branches);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (policy towards aliens interwoven
with contemporaneous foreign relations policies and such matters exclusively entrusted
to political branches).
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the alien exclusion and deportation cases, the courts have acted to
affirm individual rights. Alien constitutional rights also have been
affirmed notwithstanding the interests of government.188 Moreover,
the Congress of the United States long ago declared that all persons
have a natural right to expatriation and that denial or impairment of
that right "is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the
Republic."'81 9 It is not necessary to concede to the underground the
dangerous proposition that national security requires sacrifice of the
emigre. It is a proposition implicitly rejected by a considerable body
of legal doctrine constituted by United States law and public policy,
and by related international principles protective of emigre rights.
The international tort model to remedy emigre repression is sup-
ported by this body of international and domestic legal doctrine. It
can be developed in conjunction with the existing statutory grant of
the Alien Tort Claims Act. Perhaps more importantly, however, rec-
ognition of the right of an alien to sue for a tort that violates inter-
national law would continue an enduring tradition in the jurispru-
dence of the United States. Emigre rights have been recognized as
natural rights of fundamental value in both national and international
legal development. The present sacrifice of the political emigre to the
exigencies of the underground system is not only an inappropriate
response to the police and intelligence interests of the United States.
The sacrifice is a perverse reality for a nation with the origins and
history of the United States. The perception that national peace and
harmony depend on providing sanctuary for the political emigre is
not an artifact from the eighteenth century. It is a fundamental insight
that has been lost in the cynicism of contemporary political culture.
Remedy for the political emigre is ultimately justified as a restoration
of original character to national policy. It is an opportunity to re-
discover that national security depends most of all on the quality and
strength of national conviction.
188. See note 28 supra.
189. 15 Stat. 223-24 (1868); see 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976) (historical note) (resolution con-
cerning natural right of expatriation).
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